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DELINQUENCY AND PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF STATE V. 
WILLIAMS ON JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION IN 
OHIO 
Amy Grover* 
The juvenile justice system was founded upon the notion that children 
who commit acts that would be crimes if committed by adults are 
different than adults who engage in the same behaviors.1  This 
distinction led to the establishment of a distinct court system for 
juveniles that focused on rehabilitating youth rather than punishing 
them, with an ultimate goal of guiding them “toward life 
as . . . responsible, law-abiding adult[s].”2  However, recent federal and 
state laws that require youth who are adjudicated delinquent in juvenile 
courts to register as sex offenders are more punitive than rehabilitative, 
and actually can deter children who commit sex offenses from later 
becoming productive members of society.3  In State v. Williams, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that these registration 
requirements were punitive,4 and effectively admitted that Ohio’s 
juvenile justice system has been punishing juvenile sex offenders 
instead of rehabilitating them. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in State v. Williams has 
significantly impacted the way the law approaches sex offender 
registration.5  Prior to the court’s decision, Ohio considered sex offender 
registration laws to be a primarily remedial measure rather than a 
punitive restriction.6 However, the court determined that new 
amendments to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950 had made the 
registration requirements primarily punitive, therefore making 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. ABA Division for Public Education,THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIALOGUE ON 
YOUTH AND JUSTICE  5 (2007) , available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJfull.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally JUSTICE POLICY INST., REGISTERING HARM: HOW SEX OFFENSE REGISTRIES 
FAIL YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES 5 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-
11_RPT_WalshActRegisteringHarm_JJ-PS.pdf. 
 4. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 758 (Ohio 2010); State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 
117 (Ohio 2008). 
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retroactive application of the law unconstitutional.7  
Punitive classification of sex offender registration laws will likely 
have remarkable implications for juvenile sex offender registration 
requirements in Ohio.  The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the 
prohibition on retroactive application of these requirements applies to 
juveniles as well as adults.8 However, because the dispositions of 
juvenile delinquents are meant to be primarily rehabilitative, not 
punitive, juvenile defenders in Ohio should argue against the 
prospective imposition of punitive registration requirements on juvenile 
sex offenders as well. 
Part II of this Comment will examine the emerging trend in United 
States Supreme Court decisions of recognizing the differences between 
adults and children, along with the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile 
justice system.  Part III will provide an overview of the current state of 
sex offender registration in Ohio, including the requirements for both 
adult and juvenile offenders.  In Part IV, this Comment will discuss the 
Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Williams.  Finally, Part V 
will explain why juvenile sex offender registration requirements are 
both invalid and in violation of the Due Process Clause when the recent 
decisions the Supreme Courts of the United States and Ohio are 
considered.  The limited protective value of these requirements does not 
justify the extreme intrusion into the youth’s life and privacy created by 
registration laws.  Requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders is 
ineffective, anti-rehabilitative, and unconstitutional. 
II. RECOGNIZING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHILDREN AND ADULTS 
Anyone who has ever known a child or adolescent can say without 
question that juveniles and adults are physically, cognitively, and 
emotionally different.  The United States Supreme Court has also 
recently recognized this fact, and, using psychological research 
regarding adolescent development, has made several alterations to the 
criminal law to account for these variances.  However, the differences 
between children and adults have long been recognized in the American 
justice system through the juvenile court system and the civil, rather 
than criminal, ramifications of its decisions.  Juvenile court was founded 
on the principle of rehabilitation, not punishment, and therefore its 
adjudications are intended to help transform children into productive 
members of society rather than punish children for their wrongdoing. 
 
 7. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113. 
 8. In re D.J.S., 957 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio 2011). 
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A. The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions Altering Criminal Law for 
Juveniles 
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized the differences between children and adult in its decisions, 
and allowed for concessions or changes in criminal law based solely on 
the juvenile status of the defendants.  In Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
discussed three general differences between children and adults, which it 
used to justify the abolition of the death penalty for children on the 
grounds that it was cruel and unusual punishment.9  
The Court’s first observation was that children exhibit “a lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that often leads 
to “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”10  In other 
words, due to their immaturity, juveniles tend to act impulsively and are 
unable to consider fully the possible consequences of their actions.  
Children typically make decisions based on their instinct, instead of 
engaging in the cost–benefit analysis most responsible adults 
subconsciously consider before making most of their choices. 
Secondly, the Court concluded that children are “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure.”11  Because juveniles are less secure in their individual 
identities, it is much easier for them to get swept into whatever activities 
in which their peers are engaging.12  In the same vein, other people’s 
opinions influence them to a greater extent. 
Finally, the Court recognized that “the character of a juvenile is not as 
well formed as that of an adult,” meaning that a child’s personality traits 
are “more transitory, less fixed.”13  A juvenile’s personality is not set in 
stone; rather, it is constantly in the process of being formed.  Every 
outside force with which a child comes into contact and every 
experience that child goes through contributes to the shaping of his or 
her personality, conscience, and character.14 
Taking these differences into consideration, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it 
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably deprived character,”15 that “a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
 
 9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 10. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 570. 
 14. Aaron M. White, The Changing Adolescent Brain, EDUC. CAN., Spring 2005, at 6. 
 15. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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reformed,”16 and children have “diminished culpability” in any crime 
they might commit.17  Recognizing that because children’s immense 
capability to be rehabilitated and the limited culpability in children’s 
actions render it nearly impossible for even the wisest and most capable 
of psychiatrists to pick out the rare juvenile offender who is completely 
beyond rehabilitation, the Court concluded that it is unconstitutional to 
determine that an attempt at rehabilitation would be in vain and sentence 
a child to death.18 
The Court also considered the differences between adults and children 
in Graham v. Florida, where it concluded that life without parole was 
cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes.19  In determining that life without parole for 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders was not justified by the retributive value 
of the sentence, the Court looked to the psychological conclusions 
underlying the holding in Roper, specifically the diminished culpability 
of juvenile offenders.20  Finding that life without parole did not provide 
juveniles with a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation, the Court 
held that it was an inappropriate and unconstitutional sentence for youth 
who committed nonhomicide crimes.21 
Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expanded its 
holding in Graham to find that the Eighth Amendment also forbids 
sentencing laws that require juvenile offenders to receive a sentence of 
life without parole for committing homicide.22  Looking to the Graham 
factors, the Court concluded that “[s]uch a scheme prevents those 
meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s lessened 
culpability and greater capacity for change.”23  While youth who 
commit homicide may still receive life without parole, the sentencing 
court must be able to determine whether “his youth and its attendant 
characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser 
sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more 
appropriate.”24  
The Supreme Court has also looked to the Roper factors to inform its 
analysis in other areas of criminal law.  In J.B.D. v. North Carolina, the 
Court acknowledged the widespread acceptance of these deductions, 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 571. 
 18. Id. at 573. 
 19. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 2028. 
 21. Id. at 2030. 
 22. Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646, slip. op. at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
 23. Id. at 1. 
 24. Id. 
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going so far as referring to them as “commonsense conclusions.”25  The 
Court observed that “[t]he law has historically reflected the same 
assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise 
mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand 
the world around them,”26 and reiterated many previous statements that 
explained “what any parent knows”27: children are not miniature 
adults.28  Considering the differences between adults and children, the 
Court concluded that age should be considered when determining for 
Miranda purposes the reasonableness of a person’s belief that he or she 
was in custody, even though other subjective factors are not permitted to 
be considered.29  
These four decisions illustrate the Court’s recognition of the key 
differences between juveniles and adults; namely, that juveniles make 
less cognizant decisions, are less culpable for their actions, and have a 
greater susceptibility to rehabilitation; and that because of these 
differences, juvenile offenders should receive different treatment and 
punishment than adult offenders do.  In all four of these cases, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly chose to alter well-established criminal law 
principles in order to address more appropriately the unique situation of 
the juvenile offender. 
B. The Rehabilitative Purpose of the Juvenile Justice System 
Although the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the differences 
between adults and children only recently, the juvenile justice system 
has treated children differently than the criminal justice system treats 
adults since separate courts were established for children.30  The system 
was established to provide juveniles with rehabilitative, rather than 
punitive, dispositions.31  The chapter in the Ohio Revised Code on 
juvenile delinquency states that “[t]he overriding purposes for 
dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, 
and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, 
protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for 
the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.” 
 
 25. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 28. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403. 
 29. Id. at 2405. 
 30. Jessica E. Brown, Note, Classifying Juveniles “Among the Worst Offenders”: Utilizing 
Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adolescent Sex 
Offenders, 39 STETSON L. REV. 369, 370 (2010). 
 31. Id. 
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32  Even though the Code does mention holding the offender accountable 
for his actions, the primary concern of the juvenile justice system is to 
rehabilitate the offender and restore him as a productive member of the 
community.33  The Supreme Court of Ohio itself noted this distinction, 
and recently concluded that “[j]uvenile delinquency proceedings are 
civil rather than criminal in character,”34 and “[j]uvenile courts are 
unique and are tied to the goal of rehabilitation.”35  In examining the 
differences between juvenile dispositions and criminal sentences to 
determine what due process protections must be provided to a youth 
who was given a blended sentence, the court in State v. D.H. also 
emphasized that “[t]he purposes of felony sentencing, on the other 
hand, ‘are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and 
others and to punish the offender.’”36 
Additionally, because juvenile delinquency hearings are considered 
civil and not criminal proceedings, children are not afforded all of the 
same rights given to adults in criminal trials.37  Among the procedural 
rights denied to children in their delinquency hearings is the right to a 
trial by jury.38  Rather, juvenile delinquency cases are heard in bench 
trials, and a child’s disposition is determined by a judge, without the 
procedural protection of a jury.39  Since juvenile delinquents are not 
afforded the full due process of law required in adult criminal 
proceedings, it is even more important to focus juvenile dispositions on 
rehabilitating the child and not on punishing the child for his or her 
actions. 
III. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
Ohio Sex offender registration requirements are based on adaptations 
of the Federal legislation.  Federal law itself does not distinguish 
between juvenile and criminal offenders.  Likewise, in Ohio, juvenile 
delinquents may be subject to the same registration requirements as 
criminal defendants.  Juvenile offenders may be ordered to register 
under the registration requirements of any of the three tiers created by 
the Adam Walsh Act, or under the restrictions of the uniquely juvenile 
category of Public Registry-Qualified Juvenile Offender Registrant. 
 
 32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.01 (West 2012). 
 33. Cope v. Campbell, 196 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ohio 1964) (overruled in part by In re Agler, 249 
N.E.2d 808 (Ohio 1969)). 
 34. In re A.J.S., 897 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Ohio 2008). 
 35. State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209, 216 (Ohio 2009). 
 36. Id. at 217 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(A) (West 2011)). 
 37. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 25. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/7
2012] CASENOTE—STATE V. WILLIAMS 297 
A. Criminal Registration Requirements 
Congress passed “Megan’s Law” in 1994 in response to the rape and 
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka.  The bill demanded that every 
state create a registry for violent and child sex offenders to avoid losing 
ten percent of its funding under Section 506 of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3765).40  In 1996, 
Congress amended the law to require states to inform citizens of 
registered sex offenders in their neighborhoods.41  
In 2006, Congress increased its demands on the states by passing the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act in commemoration of the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of six-year-old Adam Walsh’s abduction and 
murder.42  The Act classified sex offenders into three different tiers 
based on their offense, 43 increased registration requirements,44 and 
established a national sex offender registry.45  It also required states to 
adopt the title within three years of the enactment in order to maintain 
their current level of funding.46  These requirements were established 
“[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against 
children and in response to vicious attacks by violent predators.” 47 
Ohio adopted Megan’s Law through Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 2560 in 1996, and the requirements were significantly 
amended in 2003 by Am. Sub. S.B. 5 (S.B. 5) 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
6558.48  The state legislature subsequently implemented the Adam 
Walsh Act through Am. Sub.  S.B. 10 (S.B. 10) in 2007.49 Both 
adoptions amended Chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code to comply 
with the federal requirements.50 
B. Juvenile Registration Requirements 
Under Ohio law, certain juvenile sex offenders are also required to 
comply with the registration requirements of O.R.C. Chapter 2950.  S.B. 
 
 40. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. 
L.J. 315, 316 (2001). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Public Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 2, 120 
Stat. 587, 589 (2006). 
 43. Id. § 111. 
 44. Id. § 117. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. §§ 124–25. 
 47. Id. § 102. 
 48. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ohio 2011). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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10 divides juvenile sex offenders into the three tiers created in the Adam 
Walsh Act.51  It also establishes a fourth category for the Public 
Registry-Qualified Juvenile Offender Registrant (PRQJOR), which 
places a child on the online sex offender registry.52  Additionally, the 
bill requires that juvenile courts automatically classify children who 
commit certain sex offenses and receive a Serious Youthful Offender 
sentence as both Tier III offenders and PRQJORs.53  However, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio recently determined that the automatic 
classification of such youth constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 
making O.R.C. § 2152.86 unconstitutional.54  Accordingly, this 
Comment will not further discuss PRQJOR status. 
All children who are sixteen or seventeen at the time they commit 
their offense must be classified as juvenile offender registrants.55  
Furthermore, juvenile offenders aged fourteen through seventeen at the 
time they commit an offense are required to register if they have been 
adjudicated delinquent for committing a sex offense or a child–victim 
offense before.56  This requirement exists without regard to how long 
ago the child committed his or her first offense or to the child’s age at 
the time of the first offense.57  These registration requirements are 
mandatory, and there is no discretion left to the judge to determine 
whether or not registration is necessary based on the potential 
dangerousness of the juvenile or his or her likelihood to reoffend.58  
However, juvenile courts do have discretion to decide which tier is the 
appropriate classification for non-PRQJOR youth, including mandatory 
registrants.59  
In addition to creating mandatory juvenile registrants, the Code also 
gives judges the discretion to determine that some first-time offenders 
who were fourteen or fifteen at the time of their offense should be 
required to register.60  The factors that judges are required to consider 
include the nature of the offense committed by the child, whether the 
child has displayed any genuine remorse for the offense, the welfare and 
safety of the general public, the results of any treatment provided to the 
child and of any follow-up professional assessment of the child, and 
 
 51. JUVENILE DIVISION, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER, OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE PROVISIONS OF 
SENATE BILL 10, at 2. 
 52. Id. 
 53. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.86 (West 2012). 
 54. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012). 
 55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.83 (West 2012). 
 56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.82 (West 2012). 
 57. JUVENILE DIVISION, supra note 51, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.83 (West 2012). 
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several other factors regarding the child, offense, and victim.61  If the 
court determines that the child should register, it must also hold a tier 
classification hearing as it would for a mandatory registrant.62 
Tier classification impacts the length of time children must register, 
how often they must register, and the public availability of their 
information.  Tier I juvenile offender registrants must register annually 
for ten years unless they are judicially declassified.63  Tier II sex 
offenders are required to register every 180 days for twenty years unless 
they are declassified.64  Finally, Tier III offenders are required to 
register every 90 days for life unless they are declassified.65  A court can 
also choose to subject a Tier III juvenile offender registrant to 
community notification requirements.66  However, the registration 
information for any juvenile offender registrant is public record open for 
public inspection.67 
IV. STATE V. WILLIAMS 
Although Ohio law requires juvenile sex offenders to follow the 
above registration requirements, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision 
in State v. Williams brings the constitutionality of these laws into serious 
question.  In Williams, the court considered the retroactive application of 
sex offender registration requirements to George Williams, who was 
indicted in November 2007 for unlawful sexual contact with a minor.68  
Although Ohio’s version of the federal “Megan’s Law,”69 as amended 
by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”) was the statutory scheme for sex 
offender classification and registration in effect at the time Williams 
committed the offense, as well as the time when he entered his plea,70  
Williams was sentenced under the harsher requirements of the Ohio 
version of the Adam Walsh Act,71 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 
10”).72  Under S.B. 10, Williams was subject to additional reporting and 
registration requirements and was subject to those requirements for a 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. JUVENILE DIVISION, supra note 51, at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (Ohio 2011). 
 69. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). 
 70. Williams, 954 N.E.2d at 1110. 
 71. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Public Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (2006). 
 72. Williams, 954 N.E.2d at 1109. 
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longer period of time than he would have been under S.B. 5.73  
According to his sentence, under S.B. 10 he was required to: 
[R]egister in person in the county in which he resided, in the county in 
which he was being educated, and in the county in which he was 
employed, to provide written notice within three days of any change of 
vehicle information, e-mail addresses, Internet identifiers or telephone 
numbers, and to verify the addresses for a period of 25 years with in 
person verification every 180 days.74 
Williams appealed the retroactive application of these requirements to 
his sentence, arguing that the law did not go into effect until January 1, 
2008, and therefore, could not be applied to him because of Ohio’s 
constitutional ban on the retroactive application of substantive laws.75 
After reviewing Ohio’s jurisprudence regarding the retroactive 
application of laws, the court applied a two-prong test.76  First, the court 
determined whether or not “the General Assembly expressly made the 
statute retroactive.”77  The court concluded that S.B. 10 was intended to 
apply retroactively because Revised Code § 2950.03 imposed 
registration requirements on offenders who were sentenced on or after 
January 1, 2008 without any regard to when the offense was 
committed.78 The court then examined the second prong of the 
retroactivity test, which asks whether the statute was substantive or 
remedial.79  
According to Ohio Supreme Court precedent, the Constitutional ban 
on retroactive laws applies only to substantive, not remedial, laws.80  
Ohio law defines a substantive statute as a law that “impairs or takes 
away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past 
transaction, or creates a new right.”81  Remedial laws, on the other hand, 
affect only the actual remedy provided and “include laws that merely 
substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an 
existing right.”82 
In previous cases regarding sex offender registration, the court had 
held that the requirements of “R.C. Chapter 2950 serve[d] the solely 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (Ohio 2011). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1110. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1110 (citing Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988)). 
 82. Id. at 1110–11. 
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remedial purpose of protecting the public,” 83  and that “R.C. Chapter 
2950 is a civil, remedial statute.” 84  Therefore, retroactive application of 
sex offender registration requirements had never been considered to 
violate the Ohio Constitution, as they were considered to be an 
alternative remedy for protecting the community rather than an 
additional burden on sex offenders.  However, these conclusions about 
the remedial nature of R.C. Chapter 2950 were all made before the 
revisions of S.B. 10. 
After reviewing the amendments in S.B. 10, the court determined that 
“the statutory scheme has changed dramatically since this court 
described the registration process imposed on sex offenders as an 
inconvenience comparable to renewing a driver’s license” and that “it 
has changed markedly since this court concluded . . . that R.C. Chapter 
2950 was remedial.”85  Several differences between S.B. 5 and S.B. 10 
led the court to conclude that “all of the changes enacted by S.B. 10 in 
aggregate” had transformed Chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code 
from remedial to punitive.86  Those differences were: (1) Williams’ 
classification as a Tier II sex offender based entirely on the offense he 
committed without a hearing and “without regard to the circumstances 
of the crime or his likelihood to reoffend”;87 (2) the mandatory, rather 
than discretionary, nature of his registration requirements;88 and (3) the 
extension of his registration period from ten to twenty-five years.89  The 
court was also swayed by the fact that the new system no longer 
permitted sex offenders to challenge their classifications.90 Ultimately, 
the court held in forceful and conclusive language that “[f]ollowing the 
enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
punitive.”91 
Therefore, due to the punitive nature of the amended Chapter 2950, 
the court concluded that it was “no longer convinced that R.C. Chapter 
2950 is remedial, even though some elements of it remain remedial,” 
and therefore that “as to a sex offender whose crime was committed 
prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, the act imposes new or additional 
burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction and 
create[s] new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities 
 
 83. State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998). 
 84. State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110,120 (Ohio 2008). 
 85. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011). 
 86. Id. at 1113. 
 87. Id. at 1112 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01(E)–(G) (West 2012)). 
 88. Id. at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04(A)(2) (West 2012)). 
 89. Id. at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.07(B)(2) (West 2012)). 
 90. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.06(B) (West 2012)). 
 91. Id. at 1112 (emphasis added). 
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not existing at the time.”92  Because S.B. 10 qualified as a substantive, 
rather than remedial, law, the court determined that the law’s retroactive 
application to Williams was unconstitutional, and it remanded the case 
for resentencing.93 
V. DISCUSSION 
Although sex offender registration was created to provide children 
with protection from rape and even murder at the hand of dangerous 
criminals, it actually does very little to keep children safe.  Requiring 
juvenile offenders to register is even less effective than adult 
registration, as most youth who commit sex crimes pose a minimal 
threat to society.  In reality, sex offender registration requirements cause 
significant harm to the lives of juvenile sex offenders, and might even 
increase their chance of reoffending.  Not only is registration damaging 
and ineffective, but it is also inconsistent with the rehabilitative 
methodology of the juvenile justice system and denies youth their 
constitutionally-mandated right to due process of law. 
A. Registration is an Ineffective Means of Protecting Potential Victims 
Despite significant criticism of both Megan’s Law and the Adam 
Walsh Act, adult sex offender registration requirements maintain their 
popularity with the public because of society’s fear of the “sexual 
predator,” and maintain legislative approval because of tremendous 
pressure from the public.94  Lawmakers view sex offender registration 
requirements as protective, and the government considers the violation 
of the sex offenders’ rights to privacy to be less important than its 
interest in protecting children from what the community perceives to be 
dangerous criminals “who prey on children.”95  The public also justifies 
this devaluation of the rights of convicted sex offenders because 
proponents of registration laws have worked to dehumanize sex 
offenders, portraying them as “lions in the tall grass waiting to attack,”96 
“monsters,”97 “beast[s],”98 and even “the human equivalent of toxic 
 
 92. Id. at 1113. 
 93. Id at 1113. 
 94. See, e.g., Mark A. Palmer, Sexual Predators, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at A16. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Don McPherson, The myth of the ‘monster’ pedophile, CNN, Nov. 8, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-08/opinion/opinion_mcpherson-pedophiles_1_prevention-of-sexual-
abuse-sexual-predators-jerry-sandusky?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Filler, supra note 40, at 339. 
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waste.”99  When sex offenders are portrayed in such an animalistic and 
predatory light, it is easy to see why registration requirements maintain 
both public and legislative support. 
However, studies have shown that sex offender registration laws do 
very little to prevent violent sexual crimes.  In fact, many opponents of 
the Adam Walsh Act maintain that registration laws are “ill-considered, 
poorly crafted, and may cause more harm than good.”100  The legislation 
was designed based on the idea that, because sex offenders often 
continually hunt for and prey on random children,101 registration can 
help parents and law enforcement officials protect these children.102  
However, the truth of the matter is that three out of four sex offenders 
do not recidivate, and approximately 90% of sex crimes against children 
are committed by someone the child knows and trusts.103  
Although research supports the conclusion that the sexual predator is 
almost entirely a myth,104 juvenile sex offenders are even less likely to 
recidivate than adult offenders.105  It has been established that 
adolescent cognitive functions are different than those of adults, and 
juvenile sex offenders are no different from other adolescents.  
According to Dan Knoepfler, President of the Washington Association 
for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, “A common misperception is that 
they’re like adults.  But they’re not.  We’re mainly talking about geeky, 
nerdy, socially immature kids.”106 
Research also suggests that juvenile sex offenders are more amenable 
to treatment than adult offenders due to their continuing psychological 
development, and therefore are more likely to be rehabilitated.107  When 
provided with proper treatment, juvenile offenders rarely commit sex 
offenses as adults.108  One explanation for this difference is that juvenile 
sex offenders exhibit lower frequencies of more extreme forms of sexual 
aggression, fantasy, and compulsivity than adult offenders.109  They also 
 
 99. Id. at 340. 
 100. HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 3 (2007). 
 101. See id. at 4 (“Some politicians cite recidivism rates for sex offenders that are as high as 80–
90 percent.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See generally Don McPherson, The myth of the ‘monster’ pedophile, CNN, Nov.  8, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-08/opinion/opinion_mcpherson-pedophiles_1_prevention-of-sexual-
abuse-sexual-predators-jerry-sandusky?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 105. NATIONAL CENTER ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH, WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT 
ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003). 
 106. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20. 
 107. ASSOCIATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, THE EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
MANAGEMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS (2000). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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show lower levels of consistency in deviant arousal and are “more fluid 
in their sexual interests and patterns of behaviors than adults.”110  
Finally, very few juvenile offenders exhibit the same long-term 
tendencies to commit sexual offenses as chronic adult offenders.111  The 
majority of their offenses are the result of nonsexual feelings, and they 
rarely eroticize aggression as repeat adult offenders do.112  Juvenile sex 
offenders, therefore, very rarely fall into the already narrow definition of 
“sexual predators.” 
Juvenile registration laws are also “based on an assumption that 
adjudicated sex offenders differ in important and lasting ways from 
other delinquents and teens in general,” and accordingly pose a great 
risk to society because of their likelihood to commit additional sex 
offenses.113  However, these public policies are “grounded in 
questionable or inaccurate assumptions about the risk of juvenile sexual 
recidivism.”114  In fact, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to reoffend 
than other juvenile delinquents.115  As illustrated by a recent study of 
over 11,000 juvenile delinquents, the recidivism rate among sex 
offenders was only 7.08%, whereas the general recidivism rate was 
43.4%.116  Many statistical studies have shown that over nine out ten 
juveniles who are arrested for a sex offense never commit a sex crime 
again.117 
Because juveniles are still in the process of developing their sexual 
tendencies, they are highly responsive to sex offender treatment and 
likely to pose no future threat to society.118  They pose less risk of 
reoffending than adult sex offenders119  and other juvenile 
delinquents.120  Requiring youth to comply with sex offender 
registration requirements is therefore a highly ineffective method of 
protecting children from sexual abuse. 
 
 110. John A. Hunter, Jr. et al., The Relationship Between Phallometrically Measured Deviant 
Sexual Arousal and Clinical Characteristics in Juvenile Sexual Offenders, 32 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 
533, 537 (1994). 
 111. NATIONAL CENTER ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH, WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT 
ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003). 
 112. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20. 
 113. Michael F. Caldwell, Study Characteristics and Recidivism Base Rates in Juvenile Sex 
Offender Recidivism, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 197, 198 (2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 201–02. 
 116. Id. 
 117. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20. 
 118. ASSOCIATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, THE EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
MANAGEMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS 2 (2000). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Caldwell, supra note 113, at 202. 
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B. Registration Causes Unnecessary Harm to Juvenile Sex Offenders 
Sex offender registration has a profound impact on the life of a child.  
Being on the registry alienates the child and creates barriers between the 
child and the educational, employment, housing, and treatment 
opportunities that are likely to reduce the likelihood of reoffending.121 
Neurological studies have shown that adolescents are “especially 
vulnerable to the stigma and isolation that registration and notification 
create,”122 and because youth who are labeled as a “sex offender” label 
often experience rejection from peer groups and adults, they are less 
likely to attach to social institutions like schools and churches.123  This 
lack of attachment is detrimental to the juvenile’s rehabilitation and 
development.124  In addition, the pain, guilt, and rejection caused by 
registry requirements increases the youth’s risk of suicide.125 
Placement on the registry also reveals a child’s personal information 
to the public, putting the child at risk of harm from vigilante actions by 
members of the community.126  One study conducted at the University 
of Louisville concluded that 47%of registered sex offenders surveyed 
had been harassed in person, 28% had received threatening phone calls, 
and 16% had been assaulted.127  Because adolescent brains are “sculpted 
by [their] interactions with the outside world,” 128 and are therefore more 
likely to internalize this harassment, the publication of their personal 
information can cause both physical and emotional damage to youth.129 
Requiring a juvenile to register also places stressors and limitation on 
the youth that might lead him or her to reoffend or commit other 
nonsexual crimes.130  Many studies have shown the connection between 
lack of access to education, employment, housing, and treatment and 
criminal activity.131  Research also indicates that the ostracism felt by 
registered offenders and the difficulties they have in finding 
employment and housing increase the stress felt by a juvenile who has 
been released from a facility.132  This stress can trigger new offenses as 
 
 121. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 25. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Aaron M. White, The Changing Adolescent Brain, EDUC. CAN., Spring 2005, at 6. 
 129. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24–25. 
 130. Id. at 24. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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a coping mechanism.133  Registration requirements alienate juveniles 
from “the very opportunities that are likely to reduce the likelihood of 
future offending.”134  Therefore, although they are intended to protect 
children from victimization, juvenile sex offender registration 
requirements actually victimize the children who must comply with 
them and prevent youth from joining the ranks of productive society. 
C. Registration is Punitive and Therefore is Not an Appropriate Juvenile 
Disposition 
Based on both the history of the juvenile justice system and the 
policies recently espoused by both the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the Supreme Court of Ohio, the juvenile justice system is 
primarily focused on working to rehabilitate the children who fall 
under its jurisdiction.  Because children are emotionally and 
psychologically different than adults, their actions are less culpable 
than those of adults and they are more likely to be rehabilitated.  
Dispositions, therefore, should not be doled out as a punishment for 
wrongdoing or a deterrent of future crime.  Rather, courts should 
focus on providing the disposition that will most effectively allow the 
child to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as a productive 
and contributing member. 
In State v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that all 
doubt had been removed as to the punitive nature of sex offender 
registration requirements: sex offender registration requirements 
under S.B. 10 are punishment.  Even though the Supreme Court of 
Ohio has already held that the punitive nature of the statutory 
requirements do not allow for ex post facto application of registration 
requirements to juveniles, the fact that registration is a punitive 
scheme has much broader implications.  Because juvenile courts are 
rehabilitative in nature, they should be prohibited from imposing a 
punitive sentence such as requiring a juvenile to register as a sex 
offender. 
The penalties imposed by sex offender registration are especially 
oppressive to juvenile offenders.  Although the requirements are not 
substantively different, children are more likely to internalize the 
societal stigmatization that is inseparable from registration as a sex 
offender because they are more sensitive to the views of others.  
Juvenile offenders begin to see themselves in the same distorted light 
that members of society do and begin to believe that they are the 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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predator everyone seems to think that they are.135 
This stigmatization, however, goes beyond punishment; it is 
actually anti-rehabilitative.  Because juveniles who are forced to 
comply with sex offender registration requirements can be denied 
educational and vocational opportunities, it is more difficult for them 
to become productive members of society.  Walking around with the 
shame of sex offender status not only constrains children’s self-
esteem and shapes their self-perception, but it also limits their 
rehabilitative options.136  
Although the purpose of the juvenile justice system is to take 
juvenile delinquents—who have a diminished culpability for their 
criminal acts and an immense capacity for rehabilitation and 
training—and transform them into capable adults, sex offender 
registration requirements impose restrictions on young offenders that 
inhibit their ability to embrace a reformed life.  A system that intends 
to assist cannot assign punishment that leads to the offender’s 
societal regression, hinders personal change and growth, and could 
even drive the young registrant to reoffend.  Sex offender registration 
not only flouts the rehabilitative spirit of the juvenile justice system, 
but it actually debilitates the ex-delinquents who are subject to it. 
The harmful effects of juvenile sex offender registration seem even 
more inexcusable when faced with the reality of extremely low rates of 
recidivism among youth who commit sex crimes.  The Adam Walsh 
Act’s registration and notification requirements were founded on the 
idea that sex offenders are crazed deviants who cannot resist reoffending 
and prey on the weak and helpless.  However, the fact that very few 
juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for a sexual offense go on to 
commit another sex crime completely annihilates the argument that 
registration is necessary for public protection.  These juveniles are not 
predators, and studies have shown that they can be rehabilitated.  
However, subjecting them to harsh, punitive registration requirements 
and the societal stigma that accompanies the label “sex offender” can 
actually interfere with their rehabilitation. 
 
 135. See Mike S. Adams et. al., Labeling and Delinquency, 38 ADOLESCENCE 149, Spring 2003, 
at 184 (“negative labels . . . can lead to the adoption of a deviant self-concept”); Hollida Wakefield, The 
Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Increase Recidivism and Sexual 
Violence? 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 141, 145 (2006) (“former prisoners 
who perceive opportunities are blocked may develop a sense of hopelessness”). 
 136. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24. 
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D. Imposing Punitive Registration Requirements Violates a Juvenile’s 
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law 
Although juveniles charged as delinquents are not afforded all of the 
rights of criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court has 
determined that the Due Process Clause requires a delinquency hearing 
to “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”137  
As Justice Fortas famously pronounced in the Court’s landmark decision 
in In re Gault, which held that juveniles have due process rights to 
notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination, “[u]nder our 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.”138  
However, juveniles have been denied several important procedural 
protections of criminal trials, including the right to trial by jury.139  In 
holding that juvenile delinquency hearings did not require a jury trial, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that “a juvenile delinquency proceeding is 
fundamentally different from a criminal proceeding and cannot be 
equated to a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the sixth 
amendment.” 140  In his concurring opinion, Justice White further 
explained why he reached this conclusion.  He stated that because the 
malevolent acts of juveniles are considered to be mainly the 
consequences of environmental pressures or other forces outside of their 
control, they are “not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is 
required to deter him or others.”141  When a court adjudicates juvenile 
delinquent, it is reflective of a legislative choice “not to stigmatize the 
juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal,” and his disposition is 
“aimed at rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error 
simply by imposing pains and penalties.”142  
The Supreme Court of Ohio has chosen to deny juveniles certain 
procedural protections as well.  In holding that the State was not 
obligated to provide juveniles with a jury trial, the court concluded that 
the very existence of the juvenile court “reflects the considered opinion 
of society that childish pranks and other youthful indiscretions, as well 
as graver offenses, should seldom warrant adult sanctions and that the 
decided emphasis should be upon individual, corrective treatment.”143  
 
 137. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). 
 138. Id. at 28. 
 139. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 140. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009). 
 141. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552. 
 142. Id. 
 143. In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969). 
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Therefore, certain procedural protections are not required under due 
process of law because “[t]he very purpose of the Juvenile Code is to 
avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and insulate them from the 
reputation and answerability of criminals.”144 
Because of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system, 
courts have determined that delinquency hearings do not require the 
same level of protection as criminal courts.145  Although juveniles must 
be afforded some procedural protections in delinquency hearings, the 
established due process standard for juvenile proceedings is 
“fundamental fairness.”146  
Imposing a punitive, criminal, and sometimes mandatory sanction in 
a juvenile court that lacks the protections that would be afforded to adult 
defendants is clearly and fundamentally unfair.  After the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Williams, it is incontestable that 
requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders is a punitive 
disposition.147  A youth adjudicated delinquent for a sex crime may 
spend less time in a juvenile facility than an adult offender would in 
prison, a juvenile sex offender could be required to register every 90 
days for the rest of his life.148 The enormity of this punishment makes it 
difficult to see the alleged fundamental differences between a 
delinquency hearing and a criminal proceeding.149  In fact, if one 
considers the enhanced devastation that registration causes to the lives 
of young people, juvenile courts that require children to register actually 
impose harsher punishments than criminal courts, while providing the 
youth with fewer procedural protections. 
Additionally, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Supreme Court of Ohio have indicated that a central purpose of the 
juvenile justice system is to avoid exposing the youth to the societal 
stigmatization caused by a criminal record.150  However, requiring 
juveniles to register as sex offenders not only stigmatizes them as 
criminals, but announces to their community that they are one of the 
most abhorred criminals in society: a sex offender.  This public 
humiliation and denunciation flies in the face of the rehabilitative 
philosophy of the juvenile court.  A juvenile court cannot maintain that 
its “very purpose is to avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and 
 
 144. Id. at 814. 
 145. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 146. Id. at 543. 
 147. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011). 
 148. JUVENILE DIVISION, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER, OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE PROVISIONS OF 
SENATE BILL 10 3. 
 149. See, e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009). 
 150. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552; see In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 814 (Ohio 1969). 
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insulate them from the reputation . . . of criminals,”151 while at the same 
time branding some juveniles as sex offenders for the rest of their lives. 
Finally, requiring courts to classify mandatory registrants unfairly 
denies youth the “individual, corrective treatment” that they should be 
provided in the juvenile justice system.152  In denying juveniles 
procedural protections such as a jury trial, courts have attempted to 
preserve the rehabilitative and individualized approach of the juvenile 
court by keeping it separate from the world of adversarial criminal trials.  
However, when youth face the possibility of lifelong registration based 
solely on the offense they committed, no court can argue that they are 
receiving a treatment plan that is individually tailored to rehabilitate 
them.  Rather, they are being punished by a one-size-fits-all scheme 
without the full protection granted other criminal defendants. 
Juvenile sex offender registration is fundamentally unfair and 
therefore violates a youth’s right to due process of law.  Juvenile sex 
offenders face the same punitive registration requirements as adult 
offenders, but without the full scope of constitutional protections 
afforded to criminal defendants.  Sex offender registration is not a 
rehabilitative measure, and stigmatizes youth even more than a criminal 
record for nonsexual crime would.  Therefore, the justifications for the 
limited protections offered in juvenile court do not exist in sex offender 
cases, and imposing registration requirements under such circumstances 
does not promote a juvenile’s due process right to “fundamental 
fairness.”153  If the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court, neither should the condition of being a juvenile sex offender. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although State v. Williams does not specifically address juvenile sex 
offenders, it has many implications on registration requirements for 
children who are adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a sex offense.  
Because the holding in State v. Williams clearly states that the 
registration requirements of Revised Code Chapter 2950 are punitive 
measures, and not merely remedial in nature, applying these punitive 
restrictions to juvenile delinquents violates the rehabilitative spirit of the 
juvenile justice system.  This priority of rehabilitation is not simply a 
historical perspective, but it is a philosophy that has recently been 
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Additionally, imposing such 
harsh, criminal sanctions without the protection of a jury trial could raise 
many constitutional issues, including violations of the child’s right to 
 
 151. In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d at 814. 
 152. Id. at 810. 
 153. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). 
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due process of law.  Ohio’s juvenile defenders should explore all of 
these arguments as part of zealously advocating on behalf of their 
clients. 
In conclusion, although State v. Williams deals solely with an adult 
sex offender, it could have revolutionary effects on juvenile sex 
offenders.  At the very least, Ohio defenders have more ammunition 
with which to protect their clients from long-term stigmatization and 
humiliation through sex offender registration.  Ohio legislatures should 
also reconsider the constitutionality and legitimacy of imposing 
punitive, criminal sanctions on juvenile sex offenders.  Children who 
come into the juvenile justice system are meant to be rehabilitated and 
transformed into productive members of society; not stigmatized and 
disparaged for years to come. 
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